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How judges decide cases is a subject on which Henry Friendly 
sometimes touched in his writings.  An example, published in this 
school’s law journal, was his book review of Karl Llewellyn’s great work 
on appellate judging;1 but Friendly seemed mildly amused at Llewel-
lyn’s complex scheme and unique vocabulary.  Anyway, Judge Friend-
 
* Delivered as the Owen J. Roberts Memorial Lecture, University of Pennsylvania 
Law School, April 12, 2010. 
† Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.  Appreciation is owed to my law 
clerks, Robert Allen, Dina Mishra, Kenneth Reinker, and Weili Shaw, and to my friends 
Judge Pierre Leval and Frederick Seidel, who read an earlier draft of this lecture. 
1 Henry J. Friendly, Book Review, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 1040 (1961) (reviewing KARL 
N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION—DECIDING APPEALS (1960)).  On other 
occasions, Friendly touched on the subject, either in some detail, see, e.g., Henry J. 
Friendly, The Courts and Social Policy:  Substance and Procedure, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 21 
(1978); Henry J. Friendly, Reactions of a Lawyer—Newly Become Judge, 71 YALE L.J. 218 
(1961) [hereinafter Friendly, Reactions of a Lawyer], or in passing, in book reviews and 
tributes, see, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, Thoughts About Judging, 79 MICH. L. REV. 634 (1981).  
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ly’s own bent was toward history, not jurisprudence, and after three 
decades of arguing cases and advising clients, Friendly’s craftsmanship 
was in his bones. 
Yet interest in the subject of how judges decide cases continues to 
flourish.  Recently, scholars have offered differing views on whether and 
to what extent federal circuit judges are, or should be, influenced by 
precedent, by statutory language, by the slant of the president who ap-
pointed them, by the political affiliation of their own colleagues, by the 
size of their circuits, by the presence or absence of dissents, by the prac-
tical consequences of their decisions, and by their own social goals and 
temperament.2  Judge Friendly’s own decisions, along with the work of a 
handful of other judges, are the gold standard in American appellate 
judging.  So it is worth pondering what Friendly’s body of court work 
can teach us about him and about the enterprise of deciding appeals. 
Appellate judges have the peculiar burden of seeking to do three 
different things at the same time:  first, to determine and respect “the 
law,” this vast collection of constitutional provisions, statutes, prece-
dents, canons, and other paraphernalia; second, to reform doctrine, if 
permissible and when appropriate, in light of new insights, expe-
rience, and social imperatives; and finally, to get the specific quarrel 
settled in a just and practical way.  Naturally a potential exists for con-
flict among these aims—the difficulty of riding several horses at the 
same time—but let us defer that problem for the moment. 
Along with other strengths, Friendly brought to the tasks of law 
finding, law improvement, and sound outcomes two qualities in which 
perhaps no American judge has surpassed him:  a skill in wielding the 
legal tools and a quality of judgment honed by years of private law 
practice and service as general counsel to a great corporation.  His 
education and professional background have been considered at 
 
2 See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY:  INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTI-
TUTION (2005) (advocating a method of constitutional interpretation focused on pro-
moting “active liberty”); RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008) (examining 
various intellectual methods of judging); Jeffrey M. Chemerinsky & Jonathan L. Wil-
liams, Foreword, Measuring Judges and Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1173 (2009) (discussing the 
burgeoning field of legal empiricism); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178-79 (1989) (arguing that traditional common law case-by-
case adjudication is difficult to square with a discretionary Supreme Court docket); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Trimming, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1080-89 (2009) (discussing the 
differences between “trimmers” and “minimalists”); Edmund Ursin, How Great Judges 
Think:  Judges Richard Posner, Henry Friendly, and Roger Traynor on Judicial Lawmaking, 57 
BUFF. L. REV. 1267, 1339-45 (2009) (reviewing Judge Friendly’s views on social policy-
making by judges).  
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length elsewhere.3  Here, taking as a surrogate a few examples from 
cases he decided during a single Second Circuit term, let us explore 
how he went about deciding cases and how his experience informed 
this exploration. 
Common law judging is built on precedent—to Blackstone, 
precedent was the foundation principle and the crucial restraint that 
(in Blackstone’s words) kept “the scale of justice even and steady, and 
not liable to waver with every new judge’s opinion”;4 but many lawyers 
and scholars now doubt whether prior case law much constrains to-
day’s judges.  The causes of doubt are multiple:  sharp doctrinal shifts 
by the Supreme Court throughout the twentieth century; realist legal 
philosophy and its offshoots; the preoccupation of modern courts 
with policy and consequences.  For a law student in the 1960s, a vivid 
metaphor was Anthony Amsterdam’s likening of conflicting canons of 
construction to pool balls lodged on parallel racks, waiting to be cho-
sen to support a desired result.5 
Friendly, by contrast, took precedent extremely seriously, albeit 
less as a command than as a presumption.  His decisions regularly sift 
through numerous earlier cases, distinguishing some on their facts or 
in light of what was argued, discerning trends, and explaining aber-
rant outcomes.  His brain seems to have been built for this function.  
We then remember that he was schooled in the 1920s at Harvard by 
masters of the art of weighing and dissecting in a time when 
precedent got more consideration in classrooms and, at least formally, 
more respect in courts.  Consider this sequence from Friendly’s con-
currence in a decision: 
The authorities on which the [panel majority] relies are not so strong as 
they might appear.  It is indeed profitless to argue whether “dictum” or 
“holding” best characterizes Judge Frank’s statement in York that a spu-
rious class action tolls the statute of limitations for later intervenors.  
What is clear is that the intervenors in question were not before the 
court and that the statement was initially framed without benefit of ar-
 
3 See, e.g., Michael Boudin, Madison Lecture, Judge Henry Friendly and the Mirror of 
Constitutional Law, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 975 (2007); see also id. at 975 n.1, 976 n.5 (citing 
sources that describe Friendly’s extensive judicial experience and his time at the firm 
now called Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP).  Judge Friendly recorded oral his-
tories for both his family and the Columbia Oral History Project.  A full-scale biogra-
phy of Judge Friendly by David Dorsen is now underway. 
4 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69.  The full passage is quoted in Wil-
liam D. Bader, Some Thoughts on Blackstone, Precedent, and Originalism, 19 VT. L. REV. 5, 8 
(1994), from which this excerpt is borrowed.  
5 Anthony G. Amsterdam, Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 
109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 67 (1960). 
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gument from counsel.  While the question was raised on rehearing, the 
Court’s attention at that time undoubtedly centered on the quite differ-
ent problems that led Judge A. N. Hand to withdraw his concurrence 
and the Supreme Court later to reverse.
6
 
What has just been quoted is only a portion of what Judge Friendly 
said about the dubious history and circumstances that qualified the 
authorities in question. 
Part of this attention reflected for Friendly the importance of 
maintaining stable rules.  As a former practicing lawyer and adviser to 
businessmen, he understood the need for predictability and for pro-
tecting reliance.  But Friendly’s immersion in precedent gave him 
something more subtle than the “discovery” of some legal rule to be 
discerned, applied, and perpetuated.  Rather, it was an education in 
the rules and reasons past judges had given in handling like problems, 
a sense of facts that pushed decisions one way or the other, and the 
direction and limits of the dominant tendency.  Whether this educa-
tion led him to reaffirm, distinguish, or overturn a precedent is a dif-
ferent question.  And, of course, he was not a slave to precedent.  Be-
ing himself a temperate reformer, Friendly was ready to alter and 
improve law where this was allowable.  He titled his tribute to Roger 
Traynor Ablest Judge of His Generation, and—here the second verb is 
telling—said that Traynor “illuminated and modernized every field of 
law that he touched.”7  A judge of an intermediate federal court lacks 
the latitude of a state supreme court justice to alter common law; but 
Friendly, who helped advance the notion of federal common law in a 
narrower realm, was free to improve federal doctrine in a host of oth-
er fields and often did. 
In Friendly’s law school days, legislation took second place to case 
law; but in the New Deal, a torrent of statutes spilled out of Washing-
ton, and their interpretation has been a central part of federal judg-
ing ever since.  The task is as demanding as common law judging—
and not wholly different in its criteria.  Some statutes—the antitrust 
laws, for example—are nearly blank canvas and invite nothing very 
different than common law elaboration; other, more detailed enact-
ments confine more but also multiply problems of construction, often 
as to issues to which no legislative thought was ever directed.  Friendly 
agreed that language mattered but found that language was rarely as 
rigid as it might appear at first glance and that interpretation, both of 
 
6 Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731, 735 (2d Cir. 1965) (Friendly, J., 
concurring) (citations omitted). 
7 Henry J. Friendly, Ablest Judge of His Generation, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1039, 1040 (1983). 
BOUDIN FINAL REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2010  8:57 AM 
2010] Judge Henry Friendly 5 
statutes and prior precedents, depended as much on an understand-
ing of purpose and history. 
Trained at Harvard College as a historian and always half in love 
with that calling, Friendly enjoyed identifying the real-world problem 
the statute sought to solve and unearthing the compromises made in 
the solution.  And he not only could see the parts of the statute in re-
lation to one another but, like an archaeologist, could correlate the 
present version to prior ones.  In one case he gave a limited reading to 
a change in language, deeming a broader one at odds with the basic 
structure:  borrowing from Justice Frankfurter, Friendly said that Con-
gress “did not inadvertently add a colonial wing to a gothic cathe-
dral.”8  In another, after an exhausting march through legislative his-
tory and real-world events, he concluded:  “While this history would 
give no sufficient reason for cutting down the words that Congress 
used, it does afford ground for refusing to expand them.”9 
More dramatic is a civil rights case in which protestors were 
charged in state court with disrupting traffic.10  Based on a Recon-
struction Era statute, defendants claimed the right to remove to fed-
eral court all criminal prosecutions of civil rights demonstrators.  De-
fendants did not contest the fairness of the state court—an express 
ground of removal under the statute—but relied on a different provi-
sion of the statute allowing removal of any proceeding brought “[f]or 
any act under color of authority derived from any law providing for 
equal rights,”11 language so bland and broad as to give some linguistic 
warrant to their position; after all, might not the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments be just such laws? 
However, a trail of statutory language and history led Friendly to 
conclude that “under color of authority,” even were the phrase ap-
plied to private actors (rather than those deputized to assist officers), 
required some law that not merely permits but “directs or encourages” 
the act being prosecuted.12  One who blocked a subway entrance to 
advocate for equal civil rights was not, Friendly ruled, acting “under 
color of authority” in committing the trespass or obstruction.13  He did 
 
8 Falik v. United States, 343 F.2d 38, 42 (2d Cir. 1965) (quoting Interstate Com-
merce Comm’n v. J-T Transp. Co., 368 U.S. 81, 115 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). 
9 Willheim v. Murchison, 342 F.2d 33, 41 (2d Cir. 1965). 
10 New York v. Galamison, 342 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 977 (1965). 
11 28 U.S.C. § 1443(2) (2006).   
12 Galamison, 342 F.2d at 264. 
13 See id. at 265-66 (finding instead that the relevant constitutional provision was 
the First Amendment). 
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not dwell unduly on the fact that mass removal of state trespass cases 
to federal court would have paralyzed prosecutions. 
Friendly’s power of mind and memory gave him an unusual com-
mand of the record and the range and interconnections of the issues 
posed.  In the classroom, attention centers on a single doctrine, such as 
consideration in the law of contract.  By contrast, an appeal to a circuit 
court regularly presents not “a” legal problem but a welter—some subs-
tantive, some procedural, and some ignored or unknown to the parties.  
Each problem in turn may trail subordinate issues.  For example, in 
dealing with a single claim of evidentiary error, a judge may need to 
consider not only the merits, but also whether an objection was raised, 
what proffer was made by the offering party, what grounds were given 
for and against the ruling, what standard of review applies, the relev-
ance of the evidence, and whether the error was plain or harmless. 
Figuring out what happened—often with little help from the 
briefs—is sometimes the hardest part of disposition; and hardly easier 
is arraying and organizing the potential issues on a mental map; in-
deed, deciding the issues thus arrayed is often the easiest part of the 
job for an experienced judge.  Any lengthy decision by Friendly exhi-
bits his ability to mine the briefs and record and construct the map.  
His organizing powers faced their greatest test, and their most re-
markable success, in a series of decisions directed to the valuation of 
most of the major railroads in the eastern United States, an endeavor 
he himself described in an unduly modest tribute to his friend and 
colleague John Minor Wisdom.14 
Another problem that appellate judges face is evaluating factual 
disputes—albeit at one remove from the witnesses.  Consider what 
goes on when a judge asks whether the affidavits created a material is-
sue of fact barring summary judgment, whether a trial judge’s factual 
finding is clearly erroneous, or whether the jury could reasonably find 
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  Friendly was not 
primarily a trial lawyer, but he had done some trial work, much ad-
ministrative litigation, and frequent mustering and evaluating facts in 
briefing appeals. 
A good example of how he used this experience is Friendly work-
ing out the opposing inferences in a dispute as to whether a company 
committed an unfair labor practice by firing a worker at least in part 
 
14 See Henry J. Friendly, From a Fellow Worker on the Railroads, 60 TUL. L. REV. 244 
(1985) (published posthumously). 
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because of his union activity.15  The Labor Board examiner had re-
jected the charge, noting that the worker had been fired only after his 
criminal record of violence became known; but a few fragments of 
evidence supported the unfair-practice charge, and the Board re-
versed and held the company liable.16 
Friendly agreed that the question was the reasonableness of the 
Board’s interpretation of the evidence—not Friendly’s own view of the 
merits or that of the examiner.17  He also conceded that the union 
needed to show only that anti-union animus played some role in the 
discharge and that the Board was not obligated to defer to the ex-
aminer who heard the witnesses:  the examiner, Friendly neatly ex-
plained, had the advantage in judging demeanor of witnesses, but the 
factual evaluation depended as well on inference drawing as easily 
done by the Board.18 
Yet after applying his scalpel to the evidence, Friendly found that 
“of the four ‘facts and circumstances’ relied upon by the Board to 
show an anti-union motive in the discharge, all but the second reason, 
[management’s] knowledge of [the employee’s] union activity, are 
somewhat unsatisfactory; and the second alone is not enough.”19  
Friendly’s discussion of the evidence supporting his assessment is 
condensed but meticulous and is based on Friendly’s own study and 
synthesis of the record.  He wrote in part: 
We have already indicated why the first circumstance—the history of im-
proper anti-union activity—must be qualified by the later improvement.  
The Board’s third point rests in part on an official warning to Rodeghiero 
not to engage in “union talks” but in fact the trial examiner did not de-
cide whether the Benatoviches used these words or a far more innocuous 
command to stop “disturb[ing] the other people” in view of their com-
plaints.  For its fourth point, the Board said that Rodeghiero’s ability as a 
butcher had not been questioned; but Hyman Benatovich testified that 
Rodeghiero was “the worst” butcher and “not a good worker.”
20
 
Friendly’s legal knowledge and analytic skill would not surprise 
anyone familiar with his breathtaking academic record at Harvard Law 
School or its repeated efforts to lure him back to its faculty.  His later 
books and articles, almost all written while serving full-time as a busy 
 
15 NLRB v. Park Edge Sheridan Meats, Inc., 341 F.2d 725 (2d Cir. 1965). 
16 Id. at 727. 
17 Id. at 728-29.  
18 Id. at 728. 
19 Id. at 728-29 (citation omitted). 
20 Id. at 729. 
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federal judge, would count as a respectable bibliography for an entire 
career of law teaching.  But it was the marriage of these intellectual 
gifts with worldly experience that uniquely accounts for the character 
and quality of his decisions. 
Perhaps it was a bent toward the practical, as well as material re-
wards to support a growing family, that led Friendly to join the Root, 
Clark firm instead of taking up Harvard’s teaching offers; but surely it 
was decades of lawyering that gave him his vital experience in how the 
world worked—an experience not limited to courtrooms.  One lawyer 
who knew Friendly thought of him primarily as “a business lawyer.”21  
What can be gleaned of his work as general counsel of Pan American 
World Airways during its heyday confirms that business lawyering was 
at least part of his repertoire.22  In fact, he served as well as vice presi-
dent of the company and as a member of its board of directors. 
Evidence of what he took away from practice lies in numerous 
passages in his opinions—a perception of how the world works often 
serving as premise for some step of reasoning in the decision.  For ex-
ample, in the same Labor Board case earlier mentioned, the company 
sought to support its good faith in firing the employee based on his 
criminal record by saying that its lawyer so advised the firing.  Here is 
Friendly’s treatment of the point: 
Having apparently learned a lesson from the prior proceeding, [the 
company’s management] engaged an experienced labor attorney who 
endeavored to keep their conduct within what he considered the range 
permitted by law.  We would not be misunderstood as saying that advice 
of counsel, even if precisely followed, is a defense to an unfair labor 
practice charge.  But when a party that has erred in the past places itself 
in the hands of capable counsel who gives reasonable advice for the fu-
ture, and there is a significant improvement in its conduct, it ought not 
be viewed as having such a propensity for sin that every episode is given 
the worst interpretation, or be condemned by indiscriminate repetition 
of the phrase that its conduct “must be assessed against the background 
of its earlier unfair labor practices.”
23
 
 
21 Interview with Leonard Joseph, Partner, Dewey Ballantine (Dec. 8, 1993).  De-
wey Ballantine was the successor to the Root, Clark firm at which Friendly worked from 
1927 to 1946. 
22 See generally MARYLIN BENDER & SELIG ALTSCHUL, THE CHOSEN INSTRUMENT:  
PAN AM, JUAN TRIPPE, THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ENTREPRENEUR (1982); RO-
BERT DALEY, AN AMERICAN SAGA:  JUAN TRIPPE AND HIS PAN AM EMPIRE (1980). 
23 Park Edge Sheridan Meats, 341 F.2d at 727 (citing Welch Scientific Co. v. NLRB, 
340 F.2d 199 (2d Cir. 1965)). 
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Friendly knew too that an appeal might well have a life after the 
judgment was handed down, and he was adept at taking this into ac-
count.  One small example—an instance of his being a half step ahead 
of the Supreme Court in protecting defendants’ rights and being 
overturned for his pains—shows how carefully he thought about the 
stage beyond the one before him.  The occasion was a famous capital 
case that came before Friendly’s panel on writ of habeas corpus.24  The 
defendant—now sentenced to death—had been convicted of murder-
ing a doctor in his home and badly wounding the doctor’s wife.  The 
critical fact was that after arraignment and a request for counsel, the 
defendant had been taken, without a lawyer, to the hospital, where he 
had been identified by the badly injured spouse, and this identifica-
tion was introduced at trial. 
This, Friendly held—without enthusiasm—violated the defendant’s 
right to counsel as defined by Supreme Court decisions.  Given much 
other evidence against the defendant, the retrial was almost bound to 
produce a new conviction, but the defendant now anticipated raising 
for the first time an insanity defense.  At the end of his decision, 
Friendly added a footnote posing the question, but leaving it to parties 
to argue on retrial, whether under New York law the defendant would 
be entitled to raise an insanity defense not pressed in the first trial.25 
This sense of the practical infused Friendly’s judicial persona.  
Learned Hand’s leisurely and stimulating speculations about the con-
cept of invention in patent law or the ideology of those who passed 
the Sherman Act have few counterparts in Friendly’s decisions.26  Just 
as Friendly had driven himself fiercely hard in law practice, so he 
wrote his opinions in a burst of energy, drafting in longhand and 
normally editing the draft only once with his law clerk after the latter’s 
cite check.  As the edited draft with paper-clipped inserts passed to 
Friendly’s secretary for retyping and circulation to the panel, the law 
 
24 United States ex rel. Stovall v. Denno, No. 29208 (2d Cir. Mar. 31, 1965), vacated, 
355 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1966) (en banc), aff’d sub nom., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 
(1967).  The Supreme Court agreed with Friendly’s legal position but declined to ap-
ply it retroactively.  See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 299-301 (1967). 
25  Stovall, No. 29208, slip op. at 1577 n.7.  The Second Circuit panel’s original 
opinion does not appear in the Federal Reporter because it was superseded by the en 
banc decision. 
26 See, e.g., Harries v. Air King Prods. Co., 183 F.2d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 1950) (mus-
ing on the policy implications of available dispositions in a patent dispute); United 
States v. Aluminium Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427-30 (2d Cir. 1945) (discussing the 
history of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act). 
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clerk watched him sweep the briefs into his outbox and turn imme-
diately to the next case. 
For most judges, the first draft of an opinion is discursive, but 
Friendly’s power of mind produced sentences that were often com-
pact in thought and compressed in expression and remained that way 
in the final opinion.  When a law clerk proposed a fuller explanation 
of a pivotal ruling, Friendly replied that “Henry Hart will understand 
it.”  His oft-cited decision in T. B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, clarifying the 
rules of federal jurisdiction over disputes about copyright ownership, 
is a dense study of precedent and variations in fact patterns; but it is 
just seven pages long in the Federal Reporter.27  The concision lends 
Friendly’s opinions energy and pace, even if the reader sometimes 
takes longer to understand a paragraph than Friendly took to con-
ceive and write it. 
Yet Friendly’s opinions were far from dull.  With his well-stocked 
mental library, he often decked out decisions with scholarly asides 
that entertain as well as educate.  Addressing a statute of limitations 
issue, Friendly observed that it might seem clear to one “without the 
burden of legal knowledge” that the pertinent New York statute gave 
the plaintiff “three years within which to sue the Railroad in New 
York even though New Jersey would have dismissed her action unless 
brought within two”;28 but (he continued) “[t]he issue is not that 
simple”29 and there followed this single sentence that might pose as a 
miniature treatise: 
Story’s famous principle that limitations are a procedural matter deter-
mined by the lex fori, see Le Roy v. Crowninshield, 15 Fed.Cas. 362 (No. 
8,269) (C.C.Mass.1820); Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws § 576 (8 
ed. Bigelow 1883), evoked opposition both from adherents of the obliga-
tio theory, such as Mr. Justice Holmes, Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 454, 
24 S. Ct. 692, 48 L.Ed. 1067 (1904), and Professor Beale, 3 Conflict of 
Laws § 604.1 (1935), and from its foes, see Lorenzen, The Statute of Li-
mitations and the Conflict of Laws, 28 Yale L.J. 492 (1919).
30
 
Perhaps the most difficult problem for a judge arises where a ten-
sion exists between “the law,” as it has been laid down or as it is being 
reformed in the case as far as possible, and the intuited proper out-
come of the case measured by broader criteria:  not only a sense of the 
what “the law” would suggest absent some trammeling precedent or 
 
27 See 339 F.2d 823, 823-29 (2d Cir. 1964). 
28 Clarke v. Pa. R.R. Co., 341 F.2d 430, 432 (2d Cir. 1965). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
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provision, but also current conceptions of fairness, public acceptabili-
ty, the socially desirable outcome, and like considerations.  Of course, 
the latter considerations may justify reshaping doctrine, but stubborn 
statutory language or binding case law may foreclose such a change. 
The resulting conflict between “is” and “ought” creates, for a 
gifted judge, an opportunity to reconcile law with justice—or, put 
more prosaically, with a fair and reasonable outcome.  Llewellyn re-
calls Taft, teaching a class at Yale Law School, recounting an exchange 
with Holmes as to whether it was “right or fair” to leave a fact out of 
consideration; and while Taft would not concede the fact to be legally 
relevant, Lllewellyn thinks that the story “spell[ed] a man who felt the 
bearing of all the ‘background’ and ‘human’ and ‘situation’ factors.”31  
Friendly had just such a gift for reconciliation. 
A nice instance is a Friendly opinion reviewing an order of the 
now-defunct Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC).32  The respon-
dent company, for a fee, did the matchmaking between anyone who 
wanted his car driven to some other city and a student or other travel-
er looking for free transportation and willing to serve as driver.  At the 
time, the ICC had the statutory power to restrict the number of inter-
state motor carriers by granting or withholding a certificate or permit 
to perform such carriage.33  The ICC said that this provision applied to 
the respondent company even though the company did not employ 
the driver and itself transported nothing, and the agency held that the 
company was operating illegally.34  A district judge had set the ICC or-
der aside on the ground that the company was not a carrier within the 
statute’s definition.35 
Friendly’s decision reinstated the ICC’s order but accommodated 
the command of the law with a desirable result.  Friendly agreed, as 
the district judge had found, that the company was not itself a trans-
porter of the cars but merely an intermediary.  Nevertheless, he ex-
plained, the statute by its terms defined “common carrier” as one that 
“holds itself out to the general public to engage in” such carriage.36  
 
31 LLEWELLYN, supra note 1, at 1-22.  
32 Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. AAA Con Drivers Exch., Inc., 340 F.2d 820 (2d 
Cir. 1965). 
33 See Motor Carrier Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-255, § 206(a), 49 Stat. 543, 551 
(repealed 1995). 
34 AAA Con Drivers Exch., 340 F.2d at 821.  
35 See Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. AAA Con Drivers Exch., Inc., 234 F. Supp. 
66, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). 
36 AAA Con Drivers Exch., 340 F.2d at 824 (quoting Motor Carrier Act § 203(a)). 
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The company’s advertising described the transportation function 
without making clear that the drivers were not its own agents, thereby 
fitting the definition and effectively competing for business with carri-
ers that did transport cars.37  Friendly therefore ruled that the certifi-
cate was required.38 
Yet the power to restrict entry to the motor carrier business on 
economic grounds—as opposed to safety qualifications—never made 
sense; the requirement was repealed even before the ICC was ab-
olished; and the respondent company was performing a useful func-
tion:  just the kind of innovation that the decrepit ICC tended to sup-
press.  Not long after the case just described, the ICC fought a losing 
battle against the use by railroads of supersized hopper cars that cut 
costs for shippers but competed with trucks for whom the ICC was 
concerned.39  One could reasonably suppose that on remand in 
Friendly’s case, the agency would make short work of the intruder and 
put an end to its operations. 
But Friendly anticipated this outcome.  Toward the end of the de-
cision, Friendly observed that the requirement of a certificate did not 
bar the company’s useful service, because it was free to seek one from 
the ICC.40  Then, discerning what would happen when the company 
applied, Friendly appended a footnote to end the opinion—in its own 
way as neat as the mirror reflection in Van Eyck’s famous wedding 
portrait hanging in London’s National Gallery.41  What the footnote 
said—one can picture Friendly’s sour smile—was this: 
We are unable to share [the company’s] fears that an application for a 
certificate is sure to be denied, presumably on the ground that its unlaw-
ful operations show it not to be “fit.”  The Commission has not regarded 
such operations as a bar if these were conducted in a not unreasonable 
belief as to their legality—a test rather clearly satisfied when they have 
passed muster in the reasoned view of a district judge.  See, e.g., Moyer 
Common Carrier Application, 83 M.C.C. 83 (1960).  Cf. Bowman 
Transp., Inc. v. United States, 211 F.Supp. 354 (N.D. Ala. 1962).
42
 
That Friendly wrote his own opinions brought him very close to 
the case and helped him achieve such solutions.  Given the growth in 
 
37 Id. at 825. 
38 Id. 
39 See Cincinnati, New Orleans & Tex. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 
572 (S.D. Ohio 1964), vacated sub nom., Arrow Transp. Co. v. Cincinnati, New Orleans 
& Texas Pac. Ry. Co., 379 U.S. 642 (1965). 
40 See AAA Con Drivers Exch., 340 F.2d at 826. 
41 Jan van Eyck, The Arnolfini Portrait (National Gallery, London 1434). 
42 AAA Con Drivers Exch., 340 F.2d at 826 n.2. 
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dockets, many judges on busy appellate courts can hardly do all or 
even most of their own drafting:  inevitably, law clerks and staff attor-
neys often man the deck and sails while the judge holds the tiller.  A 
circuit judge today may in a year vote on three or four hundred merits 
cases and write thirty to fifty full-scale opinions for publication while 
superintending many other shorter per curiams or brief judgments.  A 
Supreme Court Justice, by contrast, votes on far fewer cases and writes 
only a dozen or fewer decisions for the Court.43 
One ought not be romantic about the earlier era when law clerks 
did not exist and judges perforce wrote their own opinions:  many of 
the opinions were mediocre.  This is so even if—such is the genius of 
the common law process—the judge usually managed a sensible out-
come, however weak the opinion might be.  Of the great early-
twentieth-century treatise writers, Grant Gilmore wrote—only partly in 
jest—that they proceeded “by carefully distinguishing between the 
relatively few correct cases (many of them English) and the great piles 
of trash which filled the bound volumes of the reports.”44 
Yet many a complicated case is like a jigsaw puzzle with multiple 
solutions, often as to reasoning and sometimes as to outcome, none 
being inevitable.  Courts can notice issues not raised, forgive waivers, 
remand for more development or explanation, and decide half-raised 
issues or defer them to a future case.  The choices spread out like a 
maze of tracks in a great railroad terminal.  As the forks appear, the sea-
soned judge who is close to the case is more likely than the clerk to un-
derstand the realistic options and select the best route to an outcome. 
Further, law clerks may write well but—in speaking for another—
they employ a safely formulaic mode usually learned in editing a law 
review.  Judge-written opinions have a personal style that gives carry-
ing power to the opinion.  Still, it is not his personal style, but the wit 
and the embroidery of scholarship that matters most in Friendly’s de-
cisions.  Too often opinions, whether written by clerks or judges, amp-
ly identify relevant facts and governing principles, and reach a defens-
ible result; but they may slide over the central analytical problem at 
the heart of the case. 
For example, the opinion may state law and facts but fail to build 
the bridge that connects the principle to the result, explaining why 
 
43 See OFFICE OF JUDGES PROGRAMS, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS 24-27 tbl.B-1 (2009), available at http:// 
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2009/ 
tables/B01Mar09.pdf (comparing caseloads of federal courts). 
44 GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 70 (1977). 
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these facts fall within this rubric rather than another that invokes a 
different outcome.  Or a choice of words used in a statute may be 
deemed decisive—even though the key terms could also be read diffe-
rently, were the judge minded to do so, and why one reading is cho-
sen rather than another is left unexplained.  In Friendly’s decisions, 
by contrast, the subject is illuminated as if by a great searchlight; 
usually one agrees—his archived case files contain notes from col-
leagues on the panel saying that they were originally inclined to differ 
but are now persuaded of his position; but always one learns. 
Some may think all this is fairly to be expected from an appellate 
judge—even if done better by Friendly than almost all others.  Quite 
the contrary.  Other judges, including very fine ones, have done the 
job differently:  Brandeis as a justice was an impassioned advocate; 
Black, a unique mixture of populist sentiment and (at least in his own 
mind) literal construction.  Wisdom and Tuttle, heroic judges im-
mersed in civil rights litigation, were sometimes part of the struggle 
and not above it.  There are many models for judges and, in a collegi-
al enterprise, a diverse bench has its benefits.  Perhaps different times 
may call for different kinds of judges. 
Still, reading over a term’s worth of Henry Friendly opinions, one 
may come to believe that Friendly’s way of judging has a timeless at-
traction:  the predicate mastery of precedent and record; a care alike 
for doctrine and for equity and for social need; the reasoned and 
candid explanation of the result; and an awareness always of the com-
parative competencies and limits of judges.  Llewellyn dedicated his 
book to judges in what he called “the Grand Tradition of the Com-
mon Law,” mentioning Mansfield and Hand, among others.45  Only 
shortly before the dedication, Friendly ascended to the bench, and he 
made this tradition his own. 
By curious chance, Friendly’s only long meditation on the craft of 
judging came early in his judicial career in the Storrs Lecture at Yale.46  
Following tributes by Friendly to past giants is a closing lament that, 
after Hand, neither the judges nor the work available to them is what 
it once was.47  Construing the Fair Labor Standards Act, Friendly said, 
is not the same order of intellectual achievement as solving the prob-
 
45 LLEWELLYN, supra note 1, at v.  
46 Friendly, Reactions of a Lawyer, supra note 1. 
47 Id. at 237-38. 
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lem of proximate cause in Palsgraf.48  Consolation, he concluded, is to 
be sought in the worthy task of tidying up the law and repairing small 
“chinks and leaks” in the cabin of doctrine.49 
In his concern that the role of judges was narrowing, Friendly was 
a poor prophet:  with the Warren Court, constitutional law’s domain 
expanded rapidly, and successor Justices have not been more timid in 
expanding judicial territory.  To make law that Congress cannot 
change is no minor office, and the range of common law or statutory 
subjects now leashed by constitutional law, and so governed by judges, 
would have stunned nineteenth-century lawyers:  family law and evi-
dence and campaign expenditure and civil-service protection are mere-
ly examples.  Neither is it small beer to interpret federal statutes in an 
era when they regulate nearly everything and are not often amended. 
As to the caliber of judges, Judge Friendly’s decisions show that 
greatness did not end with Hand.  Friendly’s opinions embody and re-
flect both his own remarkable gifts and the experience of a lifetime of 
intensely hard work—in class, in law office, and in board room.  The 
issues Friendly decided have been or will be overtaken by events; the 
way he went about deciding them remains to instruct.  Nathaniel Bow-
ditch’s 1802 manual on navigation taught generations of mariners their 
craft.50  Gray’s Anatomy, first published in 1858, is now in its fortieth Brit-
ish edition and still educating young doctors.51  Judge Friendly’s legacy 
of incomparably fine decisions can do as much for judges. 
 
 
48 Id. (discussing Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928)).  Com-
pare Justice Benjamin Kaplan’s mesmerizing variation on the foreseeability theme in 
Or v. Edwards, 818 N.E.2d 163 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004). 
49 Friendly, Reactions of a Lawyer, supra note 1, at 238 (quoting LLEWELLYN, supra 
note 1, at 37).  
50 NATHANIEL BOWDITCH, AMERICAN PRACTICAL NAVIGATOR (1802).  The manual 
has been regularly revised thereafter and is available today in hard copy (the 2002 bi-
centennial edition), paperback, and (as one might expect) CD-ROM. 
51 GRAY’S ANATOMY (Susan Standring ed., 40th ed. 2008).  
